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Abstract—We analyze the correctness of an O(n log n) time
divide-and-conquer algorithm for the convex hull problem when
each input point is a location determined by a normal dis-
tribution. We show that the algorithm finds the convex hull
of such probabilistic points to precision within some expected
correctness determined by a user-given confidence value φ. In
order to precisely explain how correct the resulting structure
is, we introduce a new certificate error model for calculating
and understanding approximate geometric error based on the
fundamental properties of a geometric structure. We show that
this new error model implies correctness under a robust statistical
error model, in which each point lies within the hull with
probability at least φ, for the convex hull problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Convex Hull Problem is the problem of determining a
minimum convex bounding polygon that covers n points in
the Euclidean plane.
Fig. 1. A point set and its convex hull
This is a classic problem in computational geometry, with
well known solutions including Graham’s scan and divide-and-
conquer (both take O(n log n) time) [8], [15]. The convex hull
is a fundamental primitive for many graphics problems, such as
calculation of basic shape representations (e.g., bounding boxes)
[17] and collision detection [13]. In application domains, point
locations are often the result of a machine learning algorithm
that outputs a probability distribution for each point’s location
(for a survey, see [11]). For example, in augmented reality, the
markerless tracking problem that aims to track the position and
orientation of a camera in a scene without using markers may
take a hybrid approach that relies on both computer vision
techniques and probabilistic GPS location information of the
type generated by such machine learning algorithms [18]. In
this paper, we are interested in examining what happens when
the expected values of such probabilistic points are given as
input to the divide-and-conquer convex hull algorithm, with the
goal of guaranteeing approximate correctness of the resulting
convex hull without requiring extensive modification to existing
algorithms.
We will show that the divide-and-conquer convex hull
algorithm still produces an approximately correct convex hull
even when its input point locations aren’t known exactly. This
will require some modifications to the algorithm as well as an
introduction of a new error model in order to define what we
mean by an approximately correct convex hull. We will build
this new approximate notion on boolean functions that certify
geometric properties necessary to a correct calculation of the
convex hull. These functions are borrowed from the study
of kinetic data structures [5], and so some of this work will
find application to other problems studied within that boolean
certification framework (as well as allowing future work to
extend these results to hold on moving points). A careful
analysis will show how potential errors in these certifications
propagate to the overall structure being calculated. The convex
hull will be approximate in the sense that only a given percent
of the points will be expected to lie within it. This matches the
desires of some applications - for example, when determining
the home range of an animal from (noisy) location observations,
the goal is to compute a boundary containing some percentage
of such observations [6].
A. Related Work
Approximate correctness of a geometric structure has been
considered under a number of different models, including
interpretations where the structure is considered to be fully
correct some percentage of time or where it is considered to be
partially correct every time the algorithm is run. We are most
interested in this second interpretation, within which partial
correctness has been considered under the absolute error model
[7], the relative error model [3], and the robust error model [16].
Within the absolute error model a structure is considered to be
correct up to some given fixed error bound ε that is constant
for any set of points [7]. Under the relative error model a
structure is considered to be correct up to some percentage
based on the geometric structure [3]. The robust error model
is a per-point error model under which a structure is correct
based on the percentage of points which are correct [16]. We
will compare the error model we introduce to the robust error
model.
While classical computational geometry assumes exact
knowledge of point location, goals of relaxing such assumptions
have spurred several recent papers. Loeffler and Kreveld [14]
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have considered approximate convex hulls under an imprecise
point setting, where exact point location is unknown within a
region but guaranteed not to be outside of it. They consider
the convex hull under multiple variants of the relative error
model and achieve running times that range from O(n log n)
to O(n13). When considering approximate nearest neighbor
searching, a model where points are described as probability
distributions over their possible locations has also been con-
sidered [1]. This latter model of point location, commonly
used in application domains, is the same as the one we use
here (and is described in more detail in Section II-A). The
convex hull problem has been considered within the discrete
version of this point location model (where the distributions
are discrete) by Agarwal et al. [2]. Their results give a running
time of O(m log3m), where m is the number of possible point
locations in their discrete distributions. The robust error model
in Argarwal et al implies the one we compute. While we solve
a weaker version of the problem, we improve the running time
to O(n log n), where n is the number of points. Additionally,
ours is the first solution to hold on continuous distributions.
We use an O(n log n) divide-and-conquer algorithm to
compute the convex hull on a set of probabilistic points under
normal distributions. Our solution is approximately correct
under a robust error model with the correctness taken in
expectation over all possible point locations, so that each point
has at least φ probability of being in the hull, for a parameter
φ. Ours is the first solution to hold for probabilistic points
with a continuous location probability distribution.
We achieve these results not by introducing a new algorithm,
but by introducing a new error model and associated analysis
of the standard divide-and-conquer algorithm for calculating
the convex hull via its upper envelope in the dual space [15].
We introduce a certificate error model in which a structure
is considered φ-correct if each Boolean certificate used to
calculate the structure is correct with probability at least φ. We
will show that approximate correctness under the certificate
error model implies approximate correctness under the robust
error model for the convex hull.
B. Contributions
The rest of this paper shows the following results:
1) We introduce a certificate error model guaranteeing that
each certificate is correct with probability φ, and a proof
that this new error model implies the robust error model
for the convex hull problem. (See Sections IV and V.)
2) We adapt an O(n log n) algorithm to compute the convex
hull for probabilistic points. We show that this algorithm
is approximately correct in expectation over all possible
point locations, under a robust error model guaranteeing
that each point is within the hull with probability at least
φ. (See Section III.)
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Probabilistic Points
We define a probabilistic point pj = (Nj , vj) where Nj is
a normal probability distribution over its possible locations
Fig. 2. A Google Maps screenshot showing a probabilistic point pj under a
normal distribution Dj where the central blue dot is vj and the lighter blue
circle is its associated βj(φ,Dj).
and vj ∈ Rd is an expected value for the point pj given
distribution Nj . We are given a set P of n probabilistic points.
Dj = {x ∈ Rd|Npdfj (x) > 0} is the positive region of the
probability density function Npdfj : R
d → {y ∈ R|y ≥ 0}. We
assume that the region Dj is bounded. Let βj(φ,Dj) ⊂ Rd be
the boundary region of point pj defined as the minimum-area
convex set such that pj is within the region with probability
φ, i.e.,
∫
x∈βj(φ,Dj)
Npdfj (x)dx = φ. φ ∈ [0, 1] is a user-given
confidence value, and Φ = 100 · φ is φ in percent form. We
assume that βj(φ,Dj) can be calculated in O(1) time. For
example, Figure 2 shows βj(φ,Dj) as the truncated Gaussian.
For the remainder of this paper we will refer to these
probabilistic points pj = (Dj , vj) simply as points. Within
a machine learning context, these points would be generated
by a model M(j, E) → pj that, when given a point identity
j and environmental data E, would return the probabilistic
point pj . More details about such models can be found in
a survey of location models [11]. We will assume that this
model is good enough that the point locations can generally be
distinguished from each other, i.e., that for pi, pj ∈ P , drawn
from the distribution created by the model,
Pr[βi(φ,Di) ∩ βj(φ,Dj) = ∅] ≥ φ .
B. Certificates
Given a set of probabilistic points, we develop a framework
that approximately maintains a geometric structure G up to
some expected correctness. We define a set of certificates
C that guarantee local geometric relationships crucial to the
correctness of the entire structure. For example, a single
certificate might guarantee that three points are oriented
in a counter-clockwise relationship. C can be considered a
proof of the correctness of G. These certificates are the same
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as those maintained in classic kinetic data structure (KDS)
settings [5] (we will extend them later). The set C consists
of pairs containing a Boolean function c which operates on
a set of points Pi ⊂ P and the set of points Pi on which that
function evaluates to True. Such a pair (c, Pi) is called a
certificate. Within a single set C, there can be multiple types
of such functions c, certifying different geometric properties.
For notational ease we will abuse notation below and refer
to all such functions as c. A set of certificates C must satisfy
the following local geometric properties as given in [5].
Property II.1 (Locality). For all points pj ∈ P , |{Pi | pj ∈
Pi and (c, Pi) ∈ C}| is O(polylog(n)) or O(n) for
arbitrarily small values of .
Property II.2 (Compactness). |C| is O(n polylog(n)) or
O(n1+) for arbitrarily small .
Property II.3 (Exclusivity). |Pi| ≤ k for all (c, Pi) ∈ C,
Pi ⊂ P , and small constant k.
Locality and compactness are both required within the
KDS framework and exclusivity is also generally assumed
[5]. Thus, we can draw on a large body of existing work
defining certificates for a wide variety of problems. (See [10]).
Notably, these certificates certify the steps of certain locally
constrained algorithms and incrementally constructed problem
solutions. Divide and conquer algorithms often make good
candidates for such problem certification mechanisms; Each
decision in the merge process constitutes a certificate.
We add to the KDS understanding of certificates to take into
account the probabilistic nature of the points.
Definition II.4 (φ-correct certificate). A certificate (c, Pi) for
which
Pr[c(Pi) = True] ≥ φ
with the probability taken over the distribution of possible
point locations for points pj = (Nj , vj) for pj ∈ Pi.
For example, a simple certificate (aboveφ, Pi) with Pi =
{p1, p2} certifies that p1 is above p2 with probability at
least φ. (See Section IV for a more extensive example of
a problem using such certificates.) It will be useful to note
that vj ∈ βj(φ,Dj) for all pj ∈ Pi since Nj is a normal
distribution. If all certificates are φ-correct for φ = 1, then
the geometric structure G has been correctly calculated. The
main motivation of this paper is to consider the correctness
for values of φ < 1.
Given knowledge of β(Pi) = {βj(φ,Dj)|pj ∈ Pi}, we now
determine the correctness of certificate (c, Pi). φk-correctness
can be achieved by creating certificates (c′, Pi) with new func-
tion c′ such that c′(Pi) = True if and only if for all possible
point locations Pi = {kj=1 pj ∈ βj(φ,Dj) | βj(φ,Dj) ∈
β(Pi)} we have c′(Pi) = True. This can be easily improved
to φ-correctness by determining βj(φ1/k, Dj) instead. However,
this is a conservative lower bound on the correctness of the
certificate. In the example certificate aboveφ(Pi), we would be
guaranteeing that p1 is above p2 and that β1(φ,D1) does not
intersect β2(φ,D2). Instead, we could calculate directly the
probability that p1 is above p2 and set above′φ(Pi) = True
as long as that probability is at least φ. This guarantees that
above′φ(Pi) is φ-correct.
III. CONVEX HULL ALGORITHM
Recall that the convex hull is defined as the smallest
convex region containing a set of points. In order to determine
certificates that guarantee a solution to this problem, we turn to
the KDS definition of convex hull certificates [5] that we will
review in this section. The KDS solution for this problem makes
use of a divide and conquer algorithm to find the convex hull
via finding the upper and lower envelopes in the dual setting,
where a point (a, b) is represented by the line y = ax + b 1
[5], [15].
Given a set of n lines L = {l1, l2, . . . , ln} where li is of
the form y = aix+ bi, if we think of these lines as defining n
halfplanes, y ≥ aix+bi, each lying above one of the lines, then
the upper envelope of L is the boundary of the intersection of
these half planes (see Figure 3). The lower envelope is defined
symmetrically.
upper envelope
lower envelope
Fig. 3. Upper and lower envelopes
Classic computational geometry has a well-established
equivalency of the convex hull of points and the upper/lower
envelopes of a collection of lines under the point-line duality
transformation [5], [15], in that the clockwise order of the
points along the upper (lower) convex hull of a set of points P
is equal to the left-to-right order of the sequence of the lines
on the upper (lower) envelope of the dual P ∗ (see Figure 4).
D
A H
G E*
B*
upper envelope
lower envelope
upper hull
lower hull
E
C
B
F
G*D*
H*
A*
F*
C*
D*G*
Fig. 4. Equivalence of convex hulls and envelopes
1Note that standard notation dualizes (a, b) to y = ax−b, however, KDS [5]
uses ax+ b, which we follow to avoid confusion when discussing certificates.
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GH
G
E
FD
C
E
B
D
C
A
dual plane
F
G
H
E
A:(0,1)
D:(−1,0) B:(1,0) G:(2,0)
H:(1,1)
:(0,0)
C:(0,−1) F:(1,−1)
primal plane
A
B
D
E
A
B
G
H
A
BD
C
E
F
H
Fig. 5. Top-left: points in primal plane. Bottom-left: dual plane, where a point (a, b) is represented by the line y = ax+b. Right: the merge tree corresponding
to the upper envelope computation in dual space. Leaf nodes are single lines and are omitted in the figure. The certificates proving the top-most merge are as
follows: (i) a chain intersection certificate guaranteeing that EH <x AB and EH <y A and AB <y H , that is, EH is to the left of AB, EH is below line A,
AB is below line H (ii) a diverging certificate guaranteeing that B≤sG and AB <y G, that is, B’s slope is less than or equal to G’s slope and vertex AB
is below line G, (iii) and, another diverging certificate guaranteeing that E≤sD and EH <y D. The certificates are explained in more detail in the paper
introducing them [5].
The KDS algorithm computes the convex hull in the dual
because it allows easier management of certificates. Since our
analysis will rely on certificates, we will make use of this
algorithm as well. Please refer to Figure 5 as we describe it
briefly below.
We focus only on the upper envelope of dual lines: the lower
envelope computation is symmetric. To find the upper envelope
of a set of lines, the lines are partitioned into two subsets
of roughly equal size, their upper envelopes are computed
recursively, and then the two resulting upper envelopes—let
them be called red and black— are merged. The merge step
is performed by sweeping a vertical line through all of the
vertices of the red and black upper envelopes, from left to
right. As the line sweeps, the most recently encountered red
and black vertices are maintained along with the information
whether the red or the black chain is above. As the sweep
encounters the next red (black) vertex, the algorithm determines
if it is above or below the corresponding black (red) edge.
If it is above, the current vertex is added to the merged
envelope. If the above/below ordering of the envelopes has
changed, that means the red and black envelopes have crossed,
and the intersection point is also added to the merged upper
envelope. This algorithm takes time O(n log n) [15]. We use
the same algorithm and return the same points as the hull,
so our algorithm also takes time O(n log n). However, our
certificates are φ-correct, so we will need to more carefully
consider the correctness of the resulting hull (Section V). First,
we will describe these certificates in more detail.
As originally presented in [5], the comparisons done during
the merge step lead to the following certificates: (i) x-certificates
(<x) are used to certify the x-ordering of the red and black
vertices, (ii) y-certificates (<y) are used to certify the y-ordering
of a vertex with respect to an edge of the opposite color. (iii)
slope-certificates (≤s) involve comparisons between line slopes.
Slope-certificates are not required in the above sweep algorithm,
however they are needed in order to make the KDS local—
avoiding linearly many y-certificates per edge.
In a merge tree, we keep track of all levels of the divide
and conquer algorithm’s merge step and certify the properties
that determine each choice in the merge of two recursively
determined upper envelope chains. Recall from [5] and [4]
that the leaf nodes of the merge tree are single lines and
the root node contains all line segments determining the
resulting upper envelope. The certificates, as presented in
[5], come in dependent groups. That is, the invalidation of
any one certificate invalidates all other certificates in that
group, and the existence of any one certificate implies the
existence of all other certificates in the group. These certificates
are tangent certificates, chain intersection certificates, and
diverging certificates (see Figure 6). Diverging and tangent
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a
b
c
a b
c
d
a
b
c
Fig. 6. Convex hull certificates [5] in the dual setting showing the two chains involved in red and black. Left: Tangent certificates guarantee that line c is
below the vertex ab and that the slope of line c is greater than the slope of a and less than the slope of b. Center: Intersection certificates guarantee that the
vertex ab is to the left of vertex cd and below line c and that vertex cd is to the right of vertex ab and below line b. Right: Diverging certificates guarantee
that b’s slope is less than or equal to the slope of line a and that the vertex cb is below line a.
certificates represent the two ways in which an edge will not
be involved in the resulting upper envelope while intersection
certificates represent a merge point of the two chains. For
more precise details defining these certificates see [5]. One
assumption implicit in the presentation of these certificates and
in the statement of the original divide and conquer algorithm
is that the points are in general position, i.e., no two lines in
the dual setting are parallel. We make the same assumption.
See Figure 5 for an example involving eight points (shown
both in primal space and the dual space), and the merge tree
corresponding to the upper envelope computation.
Convex Hull Algorithm: Using these certificates, we
now have the following algorithm. Create the certificates
based on the expected values of the points. We will show
in Lemma IV.1 this gives a set of φ-correct certificates. Find
the convex hull using these certificates and the O(n log n)
divide and conquer algorithm [5]. Then find the boundary of
the convex hull of those points. Specifically, given points H
determined by the certification process as the hull, we report
CH({βi(φ,Di) | pi ∈ H}) where CH takes the convex hull
of the convex bounding regions of the points on the hull (e.g.,
using the algorithm of [9] which takes time O(n log n)). The
resulting algorithm takes time O(n log n).
IV. CERTIFICATE ERROR MODEL
In order to reason about the correctness of this convex hull
algorithm when expected values are used instead of precise
points, we introduce a new error model that evaluates the
correctness of a geometric structure based on the correctness
of its component certificates.
Definition IV.1 (φ-correct within the certificate error model).
Given a set of certificates C guaranteeing a geometric structure,
for all (c, Pi) ∈ C, (c, Pi) is φ-correct.
When we originally construct the set of certificates for a
problem we will do so based on the set of expected values
of the points, V (Pi) = {vj |pj ∈ Pi}. The question then
becomes what is the relationship between certificates involving
the expected values and those involving the set of points at
their full distribution of locations. Certificates that are 1-correct
based on the expected values are easily achieved by making
the direct comparisons based on the known expected values,
the question is how these relate to the certificates involving
the points. Recall that vi ∈ βi(φ,Di) for normal distributions.
Lemma IV.1. Given that
Pr[βj(φ,Dj) ∩ βk(φ,Dk) = ∅] ≥ φ for all pj , pk ∈ Pi
where Pi ⊂ P , then
(
Pr[c(V (Pi)) = True] = 1
)
=⇒ (Pr[c(Pi) = True] ≥ φ
)
.
Proof: Consider the cases when c(Pi) = False: either
βj(φ,Dj)∩βk(φ,Dk) 
= ∅ or at least one of the true locations
p′j associated with pj ∈ Pi is outside of βj(φ,Dj). Both
of these cases occur with probability at most 1 − φ, so the
certificate probability guarantee of φ has been verified.
With this lemma, we have the following basic procedure for
translating any existing set of certificates into a φ-correct set:
1) Create a set of 1-correct certificates based on the expected
values of the points. These certificates are a set of φ-
correct certificates involving points, by Lemma IV.1.
2) Solve the problem using these certificates as usual.
3) Return a worst case result based on the boundaries of
the points in the solution.
Step 3 will be explained in more detail for each specific problem
solution.
Here, we begin with an example problem that demonstrates
the value and structure of the certificate error model without the
complexity of the convex hull certificates that will be described
in Section III.
A. 1D Maximum Problem
The 1D Maximum Problem determines the maximum point
among a set of n one-dimensional points. We will assume
that these points are in general position. We will use the
same certificates as those in the KDS solution to this problem,
which relies on a max heap that maintains the full ordering of
the points. The n − 1 certificates guarantee the parent-child
relationships in the heap [5].
Following the general procedure outlined above, parent-child
certificates are created based on their expected values. We
will say that aboveφ(p, q) certifies that Pr[p > q] ≥ φ. The
original certificates created are above1(vp, vq). By Lemma IV.1,
this gives us certificates aboveφ(p, q). Since vp ∈ βp(φ,Dp)
and vq ∈ βq(φ,Dq), we also have that aboveφ(p, q) =⇒(
aboveφ(p, vq) ∧ aboveφ(vp, q)
)
. We find the point m that
is the maximum based on these certificates and report the
value max = max{p ∈ βm(φ,Dm)} as the result of the 1D
maximum problem.
For example, consider the max heap shown in Figure
7 maintaining probabilistic points m, p, q, r and s. There
are four certificates: aboveφ(m, p), aboveφ(p, q), aboveφ(p, r)
and aboveφ(m, s) associated with this heap. Recall that
aboveφ(p, q) certifies that p > q with probability at least φ.
The expected values vp at which these points are believed to
be are shown within each node. In the case where the boundary
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Fig. 7. Max-heap for the 1D Maximum problem.
extends 1 unit in each direction centered at vm, the maximum
returned is 15 = max{βm(φ,Dφ)}.
However, the true value of a point may differ from what
is believed, which may cause a certificate to be incorrect.
For example, if point q has a true value of 16, it makes the
certificate aboveφ(p, q) false. Moreover, as in this case, an
incorrect certificate may mean that q’s real value (16) is higher
than the maximum given by the heap. Our goal is to show
that this bad case does not happen too often. We will use the
assumption that the points’ boundary regions may not intersect
with high probability.
Specifically, we will show that φ-correctness under the
certificate error model for the 1D maximum problem implies
correctness under a previously studied error model, the robust
error model. Under the robust error model, more commonly
known as a robust statistical estimator, a structure is robust to
outliers up to some breakdown point [16]. Defining the error
model more specifically is problem-dependent.
Definition IV.2 (1D Maximum Problem: φ-correct within the
robust error model). For a point set P with n points, the
returned maximum point max is such that
|{p ∈ P | p ≤ max}| ≥ φ · n .
Since we are working with probabilistic points, we are
interested in an expected φ-correct robust error model.
Definition IV.3 (1D Maximum Problem: expected φ-correct
within the robust error model). For a point set P with n points,
the returned maximum point max is such that
E [ |{p ∈ P | p ≤ max}| ] ≥ φ · n .
If, for all points p ∈ P , Pr[p ≤ max] ≥ φ then by linearity
of expectations, expected φ-correctness is implied, with the
expectation taken over the point location distributions. We will
thus proceed with the expected version of the definition.
Theorem IV.4 (1D Maximum Problem: Certificate error model
implies robust error model). Given a max heap with certificate
set C, points P , and returned maximum point max, if for all
(c, Pi) ∈ C, (c, Pi) is φ-correct then max is expected φ-correct
within the robust error model.
Proof: Since the heap is φ-correct under the certificate
error model, we expect 100− Φ percent of the certificates to
be incorrect. There are n− 1 certificates in the heap. We will
examine how many points can be greater than the maximum
for each incorrect certificate. If a certificate aboveφ(p, q) is
incorrect then p 
∈ βp or q 
∈ βq . We will associate each point
outside of its boundary with the certificate it participates in
as a child. Recall from Definition II.4 that the location of
q′ being drastically different from vq does not invalidate the
child certificates of q - those were still made with respect
to q = (vq, Dq). Thus, each incorrect certificate (associated
with some point that is outside of its boundary) will cause
at most its child point to be above the maximum. The only
remaining point to consider is the maximum point, which
doesn’t participate in any certificate as a child. By the definition
of max = max{p ∈ βm(φ,Dm)}, the true value of m is
greater than max with probability at most 1− φ.
So n points will be above the maximum reported value
each with probability at most 1− φ. Thus, we expect that the
reported maximum point will be within the top 100−Φ percent
of the points and so the result is expected to be φ-correct under
the robust error model.
V. CONVEX HULL ERROR MODEL CORRECTNESS
We will consider correctness of the hull under the robust
error model which states that the convex hull is φ-correct if at
least Φ percent of the points are contained within the hull.
Definition V.1 (Convex Hull: expected φ-correct within the
robust error model). Given a set of n points P and its set of
points H on the convex hull, where H is the associated hull
region,
E [|{p ∈ P | p ∈ H}|] ≥ φ · n .
This is a restatement of an idea Tukey referred to as “peeling”
in which some number or percentage of outlying points are
iteratively deleted and the convex hull is computed on the
remaining points [12]. A conservative interpretation of this
definition states the goal as computing the minimum convex
area containing Φ percent of the points. Given the probabilistic
nature of our points, we will instead compute the minimum
convex area containing the entirety of the boundary (the
truncated distribution of point locations) for the points on
the hull based on their expected values. We will show that this
convex hull satisfies the weaker Definition V.1 above.
The certificate error model remains the same: a convex hull
is φ-correct if each certificate is φ-correct.
Theorem V.2 (Convex Hull: Certificate error model implies
robust error model). Given a set of certificates C certifying
53
a convex hull solution for points P , with returned set of
probabilistic points H that make up the hull, where H is
the associated hull region,
∀(c,Pi)∈C , (c, Pi) is φ− correct −→
E [|{p ∈ P | p ∈ H}|] ≥ φ · n .
In order to reason about the certificate correctness of the
convex hull, we will first need to understand the properties of
these certificates in more detail. We will say that a point p has
been excluded from the convex hull by some certificate when
believing that certificate’s false assertion causes p to be outside
of the resulting convex hull. See Figure 8 for an example where
point D is excluded from the convex hull due to an incorrect
tangent certificate. Note that if a certificate incorrectly causes
p to be on the convex hull, p has not been excluded.
D’
primal plane
AB
dual plane
D
C
B:(−1,0) A:(1,0)
D:(0,−0.25)
D’
Fig. 8. Left: probabilistic points in primal plane. Right: Consider the merge of
the black envelope consisting of lines A and B, and the red envelope consisting
of D only. This merge is certified by a tangent certificate guaranteeing that
line D is below vertex AB (D <y AB), the slope of line D is greater than
the slope of B (B <s D), and less than the slope of A (D <s A). If point
D’s real position is D’, notice that the line corresponding to D’ in dual space
is above point AB, and this makes the tangent certificate incorrect. Point D is
excluded from the convex hull by this incorrect tangent certificate.
Recall the tree of certificates that show the choices in the
divide and conquer convex hull algorithm, which we called
the merge tree (an example was shown in Figure 5). Here, we
consider the levels of the merge tree in which a single point
(a line in the dual setting) participates.
Lemma V.1. Each point p ∈ P with associated dual line 
can only be excluded from the convex hull by an incorrect
certificate in the highest level L of the merge tree in which 
participates.
Proof: Suppose there is an incorrect certificate that
involves  in some level L′ below level L. Despite this
incorrect certificate,  advanced to level L′ + 1 ≤ L, so  was
found to be on the upper envelope for all lines in its subtree
at level L′. Points reported as on the convex hull (lines in the
upper envelope in the dual setting) have not been excluded
from the hull. So as long as  advances to some level above
L′, incorrect certificates in level L′ can not exclude . So 
can only be excluded from the convex hull by an incorrect
certificate that keeps it from being reported on the convex hull.
This level is, by construction of the merge tree, the highest
level at which  participates in the merge tree.
Next, we examine the properties of certificates from a single
line’s point of view.
Lemma V.2. Each point p ∈ P with associated dual line 
can be excluded from the convex hull by at most one certificate
when considering a single level L of the merge tree.
Proof: First, we consider which lines have the potential to
be excluded from the hull for each type of certificate. Referring
to the line labels of Figure 6, note that only c may be excluded
by an incorrect tangent certificate, a or d may be excluded
due to an incorrect intersection certificate, and only b may be
excluded by an incorrect diverging certificate, since these are
the lines not believed to be on the hull. Note also that some
of the lines in these certificates (a and d in the intersection
certificates and c in the diverging certificates) only contribute a
vertex to the geometric relationship being guaranteed between
the lines. We will say that such lines participate as a vertex in
the certificate, while the other lines will be said to participate
as a line.

b
b′
′
b′
Fig. 9. The solid lines show the expected positions of  and b while the dashed
lines show their possible true positions.  participates as a line in a tangent
certificate with the red upper envelope and as a vertex in a diverging certificate.
There is no way for  to be on the upper envelope without violating the tangent
certificate it participates in. In the top figure, the diverging certificate fails, but
 is not on the upper envelope, while in the bottom figure, both certificates
fail and  is on the resulting upper envelope.
Suppose that  takes the role of c in the tangent certificate
(see Figure 9): we will consider what other certificates  could
participate in. Since  already participates in one certificate
as a line, it can not participate in any others as a line. This is
because  can only have one type of slope relationship with the
chain that is above it - either tangent, intersecting, or diverging.
That leaves participation as a vertex. Depending on the number
of lines participating in the merge at this level,  may have
zero, one, or two endpoints contributing to its upper envelope
segment. At any existing endpoint,  could participate as a
vertex in a diverging certificate or an intersection certificate,
but may participate in at most one certificate per vertex. For
either a failing diverging or intersection certificate to exclude
, the vertex of  that is participating in the certificate must
be above the line from the other (red) chain. But if one of
the endpoints of  is above the other chain, then the tangent
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certificate is incorrect. So for  to be excluded, the tangent
certificate it participates in must be incorrect.
A similar analysis when  takes the role of b in the
diverging certificate argues that for  to be excluded in that
case, the diverging certificate it participates in as b must be
incorrect. Finally, remember that if  participates as a line in
an intersection certificate it can not be excluded from the hull
as it is already found to be on the hull (for this level). We have
considered all possible cases when  participates as a line and
in each of them there is a single certificate that must be wrong
for  to be excluded from the hull and no other certificate may
exclude  from the hull on its own.
Now we can put these lemmas together for the proof of
Theorem V.2.
Proof: By Lemmas V.1 and V.2 we know that each point
can be excluded from the hull only by an incorrect certificate
in its highest level of the merge tree and that each point has
at most one certificate per level that can exclude it from the
hull, so each point has at most one certificate in the whole
merge tree that can exclude it. If a convex hull is φ-correct
under the certificate error model, then each certificate has
1−φ probability of being incorrect and thus each point not on
the hull has at most 1− φ probability of being excluded. By
linearity of expectation, the expected number of points outside
the reported hull is at most (1 − φ)n. So the convex hull is
expected to be φ-correct under the robust error model.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a new way of understanding
and quantifying approximate geometric correctness via our
certificate error model. Accompanying this, we showed how
this error model could be applied to probabilistic points of the
type generated by machine learning models in the context of
two problems - the 1D maximum and the convex hull problems.
We gave an O(n log n) time algorithm for the convex hull on
probabilistic points, with approximate correctness guaranteed
under the robust error model and under this certificate error
model. The strength of the certificate error model lies in its
generalizability to any problem that can be stated in terms of
its component Boolean properties. These results could also
be generalized to probabilistic points in a motion setting,
since certificates are also the basis for kinetic data structure
(KDS) results.
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